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Who's Scanning My Server? Shodan, Censys and 3 More, Checked

Who is scanning my server? We looked up 17 internet scanner IPs from Shodan, Censys and 3 more, and show how to confirm one with reverse DNS and ranges.

ByGeoIPHub TeamPublishedReading time14 min read
A translucent blue glass server tower on a frosted white base plate, with thin blue light beams reaching it from small glass orbs floating around it, one orb on the left deeper blue with ripple rings around it

We looked up 17 addresses named for five internet scanners. 15 returned is_scanner true, with fraud scores from 0 to 96. The 2 we missed are the Shodan hosts in Iceland, whose reverse DNS says "shodan.io" most plainly.

Scanners don't hold still: they rent hosting and change addresses, so a copied list goes stale. Censys reported on 24 March 2026 that new scans were coming from "previously unpublished IP ranges", and told allow-list users to update.

What is scanning my server, and is it an attack?

Almost always reconnaissance, not an attack. An internet-wide scanner probes every IPv4 address, records which ports answer, grabs each service's banner and indexes the result. Some run device search engines (Shodan, Censys), some sell attack-surface monitoring (Palo Alto Networks' Cortex Xpanse), and some are non-profits that warn network owners (Shadowserver).

A scan opens a connection, reads the greeting and leaves. Exploitation looks different: login attempts, POST bodies, payloads in the URL. Scanners are not crawlers, so robots.txt and crawler verification rules don't apply. Shadowserver gives its view on whether scanning is legal in its FAQ; we don't give legal advice here.

So the first question is who the address belongs to, which is Step 6 when you check an unknown IP step by step. On the bot side, scanners are one of six IP bot signals, and one you can confirm yourself with dig.

Internet scanners: what Shodan, Censys and three more publish, and what we found

Scanner IP ranges are easy to get for Censys and Driftnet, which publish them, and for Microsoft (in the opt-out list below). Shodan publishes none, Palo Alto shows its ranges only inside its console, and Shadowserver gives you its ASN. Each block gives the operator's own statements (checked 18 November 2026), our reverse DNS from dig, and the lookup values. You can look up any address from your logs the same way.

Looked up 18 November 2026, 05:45 to 05:46 UTC, keyless. We re-ran three of them at 05:57 UTC and nothing had changed.

We quote five of the six scanner fields the live response carries in detection: scanner_operator, scanner_type, scanner_category, scanner_last_seen and scanner_verified. scanner_operator names the source of the label, usually the scanner and sometimes a feed.

Censys

  • Who: a search engine for internet-connected devices that also sells attack-surface monitoring.
  • What it publishes: its opt-out page, last updated 28 October 2026, lists 16 IPv4 ranges, 4 IPv6 ranges and 3 ASNs.
  • User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; CensysInspect/1.1; +https://about.censys.io/)
  • Reverse DNS: every address we tried resolves to a name under censys-scanner.com.
  • Lookups: all three sit in AS398324 "CENSYS-ARIN-01 - Censys, Inc.", is_hosting false. 162.142.125.1 is Censys, benign, research_scan, 0 allow, with abuse contact scan-abuse@censys.com in the lookup. 206.168.34.1 is the same: Censys, benign, 0 allow. 167.94.138.35 is the odd one: its operator slot names a behavioural scan feed (a third-party list of addresses seen probing mail or DNS servers) instead of Censys, with malicious, dns_scan, last seen 8 November 2026, 14 allow. The score section explains why.

Verdict: the easiest scanner to verify. It has published IP ranges, its own ASN and reverse DNS names that forward-confirm.

Shodan

  • Who: a search engine for internet-connected devices, built from the banners its scans collect.
  • What it publishes: no range list and no opt-out page that we could find. help.shodan.io lists support@shodan.io as its contact.
  • What researchers found: a measurement study of four device search engines (Censys, Shodan, FOFA and ZoomEye), with data from March 2023 to March 2024 and accepted at NDSS 2025, found 11 Shodan scan IPs with WHOIS tying them to Shodan, says engines other than Censys "claim to be users of Chrome or Firefox", and that among the four, "apart from Censys, none provide opt-out options".
  • Where it runs: rented space at CariNet (AS10439), IP Volume (AS202425) and Advania in Iceland (AS50613). Our lookup marks CariNet and Advania as hosting but not IP Volume, so the ASN alone won't catch it. That is why rented hosting hides who runs a server.

Ten addresses, with our reverse DNS:

  • 66.240.205.34 (malware-hunter.census.shodan.io, CariNet): Shodan, benign, types abusive and scanner, 46 review.
  • 71.6.135.131 (soda.census.shodan.io, CariNet): behavioural feed, smtp_scan, last seen 17 November, 60 step_up.
  • 71.6.146.185 (pirate.census.shodan.io, CariNet): behavioural feed, dns_scan, last seen 15 November, 63 step_up.
  • 71.6.199.23 (einstein.census.shodan.io, CariNet): behavioural feed, smtp_scan, 96 block. Traced below.
  • 89.248.172.16 (house.census.shodan.io, IP Volume): Shodan, benign, 0 allow. Traced below.
  • 94.102.49.190 (flower.census.shodan.io, IP Volume): Shodan, benign, 0 allow.
  • 93.174.95.106 (battery.census.shodan.io, IP Volume): behavioural feed, smtp_scan, last seen 17 November, spammer and abusive, 64 step_up.
  • 80.82.77.139 (dojo.census.shodan.io, IP Volume): behavioural feed, smtp_scan, last seen 17 November, spammer and abusive, listed on zen.spamhaus.org, 68 step_up.
  • 82.221.105.6 (census10.shodan.io, Advania): is_scanner false, threat_types empty, no operator, 15 allow.
  • 82.221.105.7 (census11.shodan.io, Advania): the same, 15 allow.

In your logs, Censys sends a documented CensysInspect User-Agent from names under censys-scanner.com; Shodan's scanners, by the study's account, pose as ordinary browsers, so only a reverse DNS name under shodan.io gives them away.

Verdict: reverse DNS is the only public tell. Community-maintained IP lists exist, such as IPFire's (last added to in 2022), but users maintain them, not Shodan.

Palo Alto Networks Cortex Xpanse

  • Who: an attack-surface management product that scans for its customers.
  • What it publishes: its documentation shows the source addresses for attack-surface testing scans on a settings page inside the Xpanse console, a customer product.
  • User-Agent: none documented that we found. Reverse DNS: none on either address.
  • Lookups: both sit in AS396982 "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM - Google LLC", is_hosting true, provider Google Cloud. 205.210.31.1 and 147.185.132.1 are each Palo Alto Networks, benign, research_scan, types abusive and scanner, 56 step_up. The lookup for 147.185.132.1 has abuse contact dl-ipabuse@paloaltonetworks.com.

Verdict: you can't verify it from a public source, so our label rests on a list.

Shadowserver

  • Who: a non-profit that, in its own words, "performs daily port scanning of the entire IPv4 Internet" and reports the results to subscribed network owners and national CERTs.
  • What it publishes: no public IP list. Its FAQ says it decided to "not make our scan data available for public searching".
  • Network: its own ASN, AS22168. Reverse DNS: none on our sample.
  • Lookup: 64.62.197.1 is in AS22168 "SHADOWSERVER-FOUNDATION - The Shadowserver Foundation, Inc.": Shadowserver, benign, research_scan, types abusive and scanner, 24 allow.

Verdict: the ASN is the check.

Driftnet

  • Who: Driftnet Ltd, which runs internet-measurement.com "to discover and measure services that network owners and operators have publicly exposed".
  • What it publishes: internet-measurement.com lists 4 IPv4 /24s, 20 single IPv4 addresses and IPv6 blocks. It says: "We don't perform any form of site crawling", and that its traffic "will never attempt to log in to your systems".
  • Network: its own ASN, AS211298 "DRIFTNET - Driftnet Ltd".
  • Lookup: 185.247.137.1 is Driftnet, benign, self_identified, scanner_verified true, 0 allow, with abuse contact network-abuse@driftnet.io.

It is the only scanner_verified: true in the set, yet it has no reverse DNS today; its neighbour 185.247.137.2 forward-confirms to r4-2-2.monitoring.internet-measurement.com. "Where our scanner flag falls short" explains why.

The control: scanme.nmap.org

45.33.32.156 is scanme.nmap.org, the host the Nmap project lets anyone scan for testing. It sits in AS63949 "AKAMAI-LINODE-AP - Akamai Connected Cloud" and returned is_scanner false, no operator, 15 allow. Its reverse DNS forward-confirms, which proves who names the host, not what it does.

Why one Shodan address scores 0 and another 96

One Shodan address can score 0 and another 96 because is_scanner says who runs the address, while the score reflects what else has been reported from it. Both of these hosts forward-confirm as Shodan, and both carry is_scanner: true.

89.248.172.16, house.census.shodan.io:

JSON
{ "ip": "89.248.172.16", "asn": { "asn": 202425, "org": "INT-NETWORK - IP Volume inc" }, "detection": { "scanner_operator": "Shodan", "scanner_type": "benign", "scanner_category": "research_scan", "scanner_verified": false }, "threat": { "is_scanner": true, "threat_types": ["scanner"] }, "scoring": { "fraud_score": 0, "recommended_action": "allow" } }

71.6.199.23, einstein.census.shodan.io:

JSON
{ "ip": "71.6.199.23", "asn": { "asn": 10439, "org": "CARINET - CariNet, Inc." }, "detection": { "is_hosting": true, "scanner_type": "malicious", "scanner_category": "smtp_scan", "scanner_last_seen": "2026-11-17T17:18:09.000Z", "scanner_verified": false }, "threat": { "is_scanner": true, "threat_types": ["spammer", "abusive", "scanner"], "dnsbl_sources": [ "zen.spamhaus.org", "b.barracudacentral.org" ] }, "scoring": { "fraud_score": 96, "recommended_action": "block" } }

GeoIPHub scoring adds 0 points for a benign research scanner, which is why house scores 0. A malicious scanner label adds 18 points at 0.80 confidence, about 14. Censys's 167.94.138.35 shows that on its own: a dns_scan label from the behavioural feed and nothing else, exactly 14. The rest of einstein's 96 comes from the spam listings at Spamhaus and Barracuda, the abuse types on the same address, and extra weight because it sits in hosting space with that record. The feed label is the smallest part. 66.240.205.34 scores 46 with a plain benign Shodan label, from abuse reports and hosting alone.

The behavioural scan feed is not a scanner operator. It lists addresses its sensors saw probing mail or DNS servers, and entries expire 14 days after the last listing. Five of the ten Shodan addresses carry its smtp_scan or dns_scan label, last seen 15 to 17 November 2026. Its name then replaces "Shodan" in scanner_operator (we left that line out of the einstein JSON), because the field holds one name: who reported the behaviour. Reverse DNS still says Shodan. Read is_scanner and scanner_operator for who it is, and the score for what it did.

How to verify an internet scanner IP yourself

Verify the address, not the text. A User-Agent and a banner are strings the sender chooses, so treat them as claims. The source address is harder to fake, because a TCP connection needs a working return path.

Three checks, in order:

  • Forward-confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS). Look up the name for the address, then look up the address for that name. They must match.
  • The ASN. asn.asn and asn.org in the lookup. Censys, Shadowserver and Driftnet each have their own.
  • The published range, when the operator has one. Censys and Driftnet do.

The forward step matters most. Whoever controls an address's reverse zone can set any name, including one under shodan.io; only shodan.io's owner can make it resolve back. Our hub covers reverse DNS and FCrDNS in more depth.

Beams of light pass through a frosted glass gate topped with a shield; each beam goes through a round glass lens to a small mirror that reflects it back to its orb, while one beam has no mirror and fades out
A reverse DNS name counts only when it resolves back to the address it came from.

Save this as fcrdns.sh:

Terminal
#!/bin/sh for ip in "$@"; do name=$(dig +short -x "$ip" | grep -v 'in-addr\.arpa\.$' | head -n 1) if [ -z "$name" ]; then echo "$ip no reverse DNS: unverified" elif dig +short A "$name" | grep -Fxq "$ip"; then echo "$ip $name forward-confirmed" else echo "$ip $name points elsewhere: unverified" fi done

The grep -v drops RFC 2317 delegation names (Shadowserver's 64.62.197.1 returns only one), and grep -F stops the dots acting as wildcards. Pass any number of addresses:

Terminal
sh fcrdns.sh 162.142.125.1 89.248.172.16 82.221.105.6 64.62.197.1 45.33.32.156

We ran it over all 18 addresses (the 17 scanner addresses plus the control) with DiG 9.10.6 on 18 November 2026 at 06:05 UTC:

Output
162.142.125.1 1.125.142.162.censys-scanner.com. forward-confirmed 206.168.34.1 1.34.168.206.censys-scanner.com. forward-confirmed 167.94.138.35 35.138.94.167.censys-scanner.com. forward-confirmed 66.240.205.34 malware-hunter.census.shodan.io. forward-confirmed 89.248.172.16 house.census.shodan.io. forward-confirmed 94.102.49.190 flower.census.shodan.io. forward-confirmed 71.6.199.23 einstein.census.shodan.io. forward-confirmed 71.6.135.131 soda.census.shodan.io. forward-confirmed 71.6.146.185 pirate.census.shodan.io. forward-confirmed 93.174.95.106 battery.census.shodan.io. forward-confirmed 80.82.77.139 dojo.census.shodan.io. forward-confirmed 82.221.105.6 census10.shodan.io. points elsewhere: unverified 82.221.105.7 census11.shodan.io. points elsewhere: unverified 205.210.31.1 no reverse DNS: unverified 147.185.132.1 no reverse DNS: unverified 64.62.197.1 no reverse DNS: unverified 185.247.137.1 no reverse DNS: unverified 45.33.32.156 scanme.nmap.org. forward-confirmed

The odd lines are the Iceland pair: census10.shodan.io and census11.shodan.io both resolve to 216.117.2.180, whose own reverse DNS is shodan.io. The names are Shodan's, but they don't lead back to those addresses, so nobody can forward-confirm them today. Where there is no reverse DNS at all (Palo Alto, Shadowserver, Driftnet's .1), fall back to the ASN and the published range.

The script checks IPv4 A records only and takes the first reverse DNS name. If a line looks odd, run it again: some resolvers answer delegated zones strangely.

Where our scanner flag falls short

This run showed five places where GeoIPHub's scanner flag falls short:

  • The Iceland pair. Their reverse DNS says census10 and census11.shodan.io, and we returned nothing. That is our coverage gap.
  • scanner_verified: false doesn't mean fake. It is true only when our reverse DNS rule matched the address and our stored record forward-confirmed, even if another source now fills the operator slot. All eight census.shodan.io hosts forward-confirm in our own run, yet every one returns false, because our reverse DNS rule hadn't matched them; a list or the behavioural feed set the operator instead.
  • Driftnet's true without a live name. The flag reads our stored record for the range, not a live lookup, so 185.247.137.1 is true while its own reverse DNS is empty today.
  • One slot. A behavioural label hides the operator, as with einstein.
  • Snapshot. Behavioural feed labels expire 14 days after the last listing. Re-run old lookups before acting.

Should you block internet scanners?

Blocking research scanners removes you from their indexes; it doesn't hide you from attackers, who run their own scans. It is reasonable for noisy logs, for policy, or for a service you don't want listed. The real fix is the port, the authentication or the patch the scanner just found, starting with what scanners index first:

  • admin panels on public ports
  • databases that answer without a password
  • remote desktop and SSH open to the whole internet
  • default credentials left in place
  • software versions with known holes

What the operators say:

  • Censys: blocked hosts usually leave Censys Search within 24 to 48 hours of their last observation, but blocking "does not remove historical data from Censys datasets", per its opt-out page.
  • SANS Internet Storm Center, which tracks research scanners, wrote in its August 2023 diary: "We do not make any general recommendations to block these IPs."

If you block, block by published range and opt out by email; community lists go stale. For any other address, see whether to block the IP, the prefix or the ASN. Drop the packets rather than reject them, as IPFire's wiki suggests, so the scanner can't tell a filtered host from a dead one. Banning addresses automatically from patterns in your logs is a separate job.

Don't block research scanners to feel safer; close the port they found.

How to opt out of Shodan, Censys and the others

Most operators take opt-out requests by email, with proof that you own the addresses; Shodan is the exception. Routes from each operator's own page:

GreyNoise, which classifies scanner traffic, counts an opt-out as one test for its "benign" class (classification docs, updated 6 May 2025). By that test, we found nothing on Shodan's site.

Next time an address in your logs says Shodan, run the check, paste it into the IP lookup tool, and read is_scanner, scanner_operator and the score together. Decide from what it did, not from its name.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Shodan scanning me an attack?

No. It is reconnaissance that indexes what answers on your public ports. The risk is what it finds, so close or protect anything you don't mean to expose.

How do I know an IP is really Censys or Shodan?

Run forward-confirmed reverse DNS: the name must sit under censys-scanner.com or shodan.io and resolve back to the same address. A GeoIPHub lookup shows is_scanner and the operator or feed that labelled it.

Can I stop Shodan from scanning my server?

You can drop its traffic at your firewall, but Shodan publishes no ranges and we found no opt-out page. Blocking does nothing about other scanners.

How do I opt out of Censys?

Email censys-abuse@censys.com with proof that you own the addresses, or block its published ranges. Censys says hosts usually leave Search within 24 to 48 hours.

Why does one scanner IP score high and another zero?

In GeoIPHub, a benign research scanner adds 0 points and a malicious scanner label about 14. Abuse and spam listings add more, and more again in hosting space. That is how two Shodan hosts scored 0 and 96.

Why is my server scanned every day?

Every public IPv4 address is probed all the time by many scanners; Shadowserver alone scans the whole IPv4 internet daily. A probe means your address is public, not that someone picked you.

Should I block Shodan and Censys?

Only for quieter logs, policy, or a service you don't want listed. It removes you from their indexes, not from attackers' scans. The real fix is the port they found.

Written by

GeoIPHub Team

The team behind the GeoIPHub API

Written by the GeoIPHub team, the people who build the GeoIPHub IP intelligence API and its scanner. Drafts are prepared with AI assistance and edited by the team; API examples are real lookups against the live API unless labelled illustrative.

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